To what extent the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978~79 influenced the ‘New Labour’ reforms from 1995 to 2001?

Introduction

The New Labour has occupied the position of UK PM from 1997 to 2010, led by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The advent of New Labour government was after 17 years of consecutive Thatcherite Conservative rule under Margret Thatcher and John Major. The advent of Margret Thatcher was preceded by Wilson-Callaghan Labour governments of 1974~1979. The sea change occurred between the two governments occurred at the backdrop of the Winter of Discontent.

The Winter of Discontent was a series of trade union strikes occurred in the winter of 1978~79. It was precisely during this turbulent winter the 1979 election empowering Thatcher was called. The crisis also marked the ending of the decades-long Old Labour policies. Therefore, the Winter of Discontent was a watershed moment, a hook from which Old Labour policies could be summarized and Thatcherite policies found roots.

The author mostly limits the investigation of New Labour into its earliest years until 2003, because the outbreak of the Iraq War of 2003, and the 20078 global financial crisis stopped New Labour from pushing through its proposed agenda. (Blair legacy) The 19972003 period was the initial years of New Labour, when policy course sticked to original plans. In terms of Old Labour, the 1974~79 Wilson-Callaghan government will be focused upon, as it directly leaded to the Winter of Discontent and fall of Old Labour, though the 1st Wilson government of 1960s may be referenced when there’s legacy reaching the Winter of Discontent.

The role of the Winter of Discontent on the demise of Old Labour and the birth of New Labour may be categorized as an influence: the Winter of Discontent influenced the policies, party structures and public image of New Labour.

The policy influence of the Winter of Discontent over New Labour

The Winter of Discontent saw major Old Labour policy failures. The New Labour, aware of the policy failures of Old Labour, undertook different policies to the 1970s.

The Winter of Discontent was the outbreak of serious policy problems of Old Labour. The socio-economic principle of Old Labour was the “post-war consensus”, a vague concept generally demanding cooperations among various interest groups to combat challenges, in this case, the stagflation economic crisis. The label of “socio-economic” suggests that social and economic policies were integrated together.

Under this principle, the iconic policy for Wilson-Callaghan government was the Social Contract, whose failure was fully unravelled in the Winter of Discontent. The Social Contract was ‘a deal in which the unions would support the Government’s attempts to fight inflation by curbing their wage demands [in return for] favourable industrial policy, unemployment relief and structural modernization’. (Social Contrick pp.639) When the principles came into practice, the Wilson government pushed through implementations. On the government side, the spirit of workplace cooperation was honoured by the newly-established Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration Service; the Health and Safety at Work Act pushed through protection for average workers, in place of the anti-union Industrial Relations Act; A price and rent freeze were imposed and food subsidies were introduced. (Old, New Labour pp.77) However, the implementation of the Social Contract didn’t bring economic stability. Combined with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in early 1970s, two economic crisis broke out: the first was a collapse of pound exchange rate and the second was a rampant inflation surged to 26.9% in August 1975.

With this background, wage restraints were put forward. a rigid, flat-rate increase of £6 a week was announced. The economic crisis led to the resignation of Wilson, and Callaghan took office, who has decisively adopted monetarist goal of decreasing the inflation. In his inauguration speech, Callaghan stated: “We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession, and increase employ­ment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists”. His solution was stricter wage restraint. In 1976, a guideline of 5% with a floor of £2.50 and a ceiling of £4 was adopted; In 1977, a guideline of 10% was set, and in 1978, the most extreme version of the wage restraint was adopted: a 5% one. Upon its announcement, the elite unionists were already warning that this policy can never be enforced upon rank-and-file members. (myth, pp.59) By this point, real wages for average workers were significantly declining, “suffered the biggest cut in [the] standard of living since before the industrial revolution”. (myth, pp.205) The lack of effective supervision over actual wages led to the collapse of guideline restrictions in private sector, further angering the public sector workers (Old New Labour, pp.88), later greatest supporters of the Winter of Discontent. Labour was determined in maintaining it, however. In May 1978, he claimed “We have to hold the line on pay or the government will fall.” (Myth, pp.208). The result of this 5% wage restraint was the outbreak of the Winter of Discontent.

The label of “monetarist-constrained Keynesianism” (Old Labour, New Labour pp.67) revealed the awkward situation of Callaghan’s economic policies: he hoped to cut inflation, a goal usually achieved by neo-liberalist reforms, but his policies relied on average workers willingly cut their own wages. The weird mixture led to a two-way breakdown of Old Labour: unions felt they’re neglected and suppressed, and went on to wage the Winter of Discontent, while the Labour and general public thought unions were overpowered, and went on to implement anti-union reforms.

On the other hand, one must be cautious in the claims of completely failed Callaghan policies. The inflation decreased significantly through the wage restraint policies, from 26.9% in August 1975 to 7.8% in May 1978 (just before the Winter of Discontent) (Statista), while keeping the unemployment rate relatively stable between 5% to 6%, therefore effectively achieving the goals of Old Labour. If compared to the rapid surge of both inflation rate (to 21% at 1981) and unemployment rate (to 11.9% in August 1984) during Thatcherite reform, Old Labour economics policies are surprisingly successful.

Besides long-term policy mistakes, the Old Labour’s crisis management of the Winter of Discontent is a major policy failure. In terms of public relations policies, the Callaghan cabinet did almost nothing to react to the accusations by tabloid media and Thatcherite Tories. (add historian) In terms of political response, the only fruit of appeasing unions was a union-party “Concordat” including no obvious progress towards the end of strikes (1pagedocument): Even cabinet members refused to disclose details on this “face-saving” document (Thatcherite, pp.11) The governmental response to the Winter of Discontent was disastrous. The Old Labour was simply unable to react properly to the Winter of Discontent, for a proper action demanded the dismantlement of itself.

The New Labour policies set its course different from the Old Labour. For reasons discussed below, New Labour politicians were reluctant to mention “historical” influence upon them. Still, legacies undoubtedly hinged on in New Labour.

In terms of principles, a general socio-economic policy like the Social Contract simply no longer exists. On economics, the New Labour relied on fiscal stability to fight inflation instead of unions. When it came to practice, New Labour gave Bank of England policy-making independence, and established a Monetary Policy Committee, consisting of central bank officials, to ensure low inflation. (Keynesian Economists pp.821) Indeed, the New Labour controlled inflation rate stably under 5%. (Statistia) Surprisingly, George Brown, then Chancellor, claimed the goal of New Labour was to achieve both low unemployment and low inflation rate, “contrary to pre-1979 policies” (Keynesian Economists pp.820) The very same goals have also been set and met by Old Labour. The difference is: If the Old Labour pursued low inflation unwillingly by relying on unions, the New Labour embraced monetarist economics to bring down inflation.

The union policies of New Labour was significantly different from the union-centrality policies of Old Labour. In the 1997 manifesto, the adoption of Thatcherite anti-unionism was stated: “Key elements of the 1980s trade union reforms to stay”. In practice, the powerlessness of unions was indicated by decrease of strikes: The average number of workplace stoppages declined from 2400 per year during Wilson-Callaghan years to 154 per year during New Labour years. (New unions, pp.373) Of course, certain union-friendly policies were made, notably the Warwick agreement, in which New Labour agreed over 100 union pledges, for instance repeal different treatments of state and private employees in public sector. However, the degree of union-appealing policies were weaker than that of Old Labour: For instance, New Labour pledge to raise protection for strikers but not repealing the anti-strike Thatcherite laws. (New unions, pp.375) In general, New Labour union policies set its course significantly from Old Labour union-favouring policies, but was friendlier towards union than Thatcherite openly hostile policies.

In terms of crisis management, the New Labour is far more successful. This can be found in a simple fact: No major domestic crisis struck New Labour in public memory. The absence of crisis proved the success of New Labour’s tackling of public images, setting itself drastically from the Old Labour troubled with endless crisis. New Labour invested into public image through significantly expanding the media and press operation of Number 10. (New Labour, Old Labour pp. 313). The Monfield report of 1997 outlined that “all major interviews and media appearances, both print and broadcast, should be agreed with the No. 10 Press Office before any commitments are entered into.”. (Governing New Labour, pp.99) When it came into figures, the COI (Clearing house for the purchasing of government advertising) statistics revealed a significant increase in New Labour advertising expenditure, from £ 110.8m in 19978 to £173.4m in 19989, to £295.4m in 2000~1. (Governing New Labour, pp.91) From both policy guidelines and actual conducts, the New Labour strongly emphasized public image management, setting itself from the media-hostile Old Labour.

The connections between the Old Labour and New Labour must be deemed as dubious, however. Because New Labour rendered Old Labour as a history to be discarded, the New Labour policymakers seldom made reference to Old Labour when describing policies. This neglect would be elaborated below. Therefore, the connections made in the essay remained dubious, but the connections could still be made because a party cannot cut themselves completely from the past.

The Structural Change brought by the Winter of Discontent and its influence upon New Labour

The Winter of Discontent significantly catalyzed the structural Party-Union “mutual divorce”, necessitating New Labour reforms.

The Union-Party familyhood was fundamental to the Old Labour Party. Founded by unions and originally named “Labour Representation Committee”, the Party had a union origin. Inside the Labour Party machine, the unions were well represented. Famously, the unions “block vote” constitutes about 6 million votes of 7 million total votes at the Annual Party Conference, therefore holding major influence inside the party. (p.19 Family) Powers came with duties. Financially, unions contributed 78 percent of Labour’s finances during the 1970s (not counting election years). (p.365 New unions) Unions were the solid base for Labour Party’s elections. According to Quinn, 45% of Labour electorate in 1974 February election was unionists or union-affiliated. (pp.364 New Labour union) With this backdrop, the Old Labour put unions at centre of their economic policies, creating the Social Contract.

The initial neo-liberalized policies of Old Labour resulted in the decline of the Union-Party relationship, and tensions fully broke out at the Winter of Discontent. On the party side, the Labour MPs, led by Wilson and Callaghan, tried to subdue unions. This could be shown by their wage restraint policies, which unions were reluctant to accept. (the Winter of Discontent, p.207) Hostile attitudes were undertaken by Party leadership. Mudge evaluated Callaghan government planted “a widespread public understanding … that inflation was union-driven”. (Leftism reinvented, pp.338) The Party leadership attributed the Winter of Discontent as a major union mistake. After electoral defeat, James Callaghan stated during dinners with Party seniors that “the trade unions did it. People could not forget and would not forgive what they had to suffer from them last winter.” (Old New Labour Pp.99)

On the union side, the union rank-and-file members were radicalized by Labour governmental policies during the 1970s. The decade also saw the rise of union participation of minority workers, namely females and migrant workers. Female membership rose by 73%, while male membership only rose by 19.3%. These people were underrepresented by the established union and party institutions, constituting a force to be reckon with. (the myth book, p.32) The British far-lefts, inspired by a series of Western union success and well aware of the growing grassroot anti-establishment sentiments, stepped in to help organize the grassroot against the moderate Labour establishment. Communists constantly attacked over issues of wage restraints. In 1977, one in eleven members of Trade Union Congress are Communist Party members. (Old new Labour, pp.94) The far-left/grassroot anti-establishment sentiments would break out during the Winter of Discontent. The Winter of Discontent was a moment of mutual divorce between the Party and the Union.

The Party-union mutual divorce at the Winter of Discontent left the Labour Party in an unelectable position. In 1979, there was an 11 per cent swing to the Conservatives amongst skilled manual workers, the core of unions, and a 7 per cent swing amongst trade union members. (the Labour Party in Crisis pp.10) The unions, as a crucial voting bank, also suffered significantly declines: From 1979~97 union memberships dropped by 44.3%, and union density declined from over 50% to 30%. (New unionism pp.369) The vote shares of Labour was lowest in 1983 (Leftism reinvented, pp.341). The steady growth of Labour vote after 1983 was accompanied by neo-liberalizing the party, famously through the Policy Review. The fact further proved the mutual divorce necessitated New Labour reforms.

1990s saw rapid reforms into New Labour, and in it union powers were significantly weakened: To name a few, the block votes of unions were taken away; the vote share of union members decreased from 90% to 50%; union-affiliated members decreased from 5.3 to 2.7 million members, etc. (New Union, pp.374)

It must be noted that New Labour weren’t completely anti-union. 50% of votes at Labour Party Conference were still by unions. Furthermore, New Labour was still financially dependent upon unions, which contributed to 64.4% of all donations New Labour received from 2001 to 2009, when donations contributed to 42.4% of Labour money during election years. The union-party relationship deteriorated from “familyhood” to “good friend”, not to hostility.

The relationship between party-union divorce and transformation into New Labour is a debated topic. In Leftism Reinvented, Stephanie L. Mudge quoted Howell for the theory of “mutual divorce” of the party and unions, when the decline of organized labour forced the Labour Party into New Labour reforms. This classic theory was challenged by Mudge. She argued that the union-party divorce was the result of neo-liberalization instead of vice versa. (p310) A fact supporting it is the party-union entity was the “organized labour”. (p310) The decline of unity was before economic neo-liberalization, as we’ve seen in struggles of Wilson-Callaghan governments, however its full outbreak was during the Winter of Discontent.

Therefore, we may paint a more complex image here: the two events of neo-liberalization and mutual divorce isn’t simply a cause-and-effect but an evolving entity. The Winter of Discontent, a moment of “mutual divorce”, was both of the impact of initial neo-liberalization and of the beginnings of a period of intentional neo-liberalization leading to New Labour. The Winter of Discontent was a direct result of fracturing union-party relationship, and it also strengthen the divorce, leading to estranged union-party relationship of New Labour.

The image of Winter of Discontent

The Winter of Discontent also leaves a profound impact in public image. As we would illustrate, there was a myth evolving around the Winter of Discontent, and it mattered because it left a significant impact on the strikes themselves and New Labour. As C. S. Hay wrote, ‘the Winter of Discontent unfolded in the way in which it did precisely because of the myths in and through which it was lived, experienced, and responded to at the time.’ In the widespread myth constructed by Thatcherism, The Winter of Discontent symbolized a failed Old Labour. Based on a political consensual image of a failed, unelectable Old Labour, the New Labour renovations were made.

The construction of the myth of the Winter of Discontent started in real time with the strikes unfolded, and it served a political purpose. Before the strikes broke out, Thatcher was already planning for a myth-construction project to get Tory in power and destroy Old Labour. In a Thatcherite report of 1977, it was outlined to “Drag every skeleton out of the union cupboard, linking it to Labour […] The aim should be to make the Labour Right wing and the union leadership close ranks, while the rift between the latter and their rank-and-file begins to open.” The goal was also simple: “A landslide … represent an explicit rejection of socialism and the Labour-trades unions axis” and removal of “negative factors of trade unions”. Clearly, Thatcherites were eager to use media to undermine Labour party structure and Labour public image. Their employment of a media firm, Saatchi & Saatchi, (The myth, pp.19), and their alliance with The Sun, demonstrated Thatcherite devotion into the media project. Important tabloid media, the Sun, the Daily Mail, all came to support Thatcherite course. By 1979, 25% of the British population was reading the Sun, while 11% of the population was reading the Daily Mail (crisis, pp.116) The Winter of Discontent therefore became the perfect storm for Thatcherites to discredit Old Labour and trade unions.

The construction of the myth begins with the very name of the Winter of Discontent. This is a literary metaphor, first adopted by the exemplar tabloid media, The Sun. Its origin was the first sentence of Richard III, in which the protagonist, a villain, states “Now is the winter of our discontent”. There’s a natural negative impressions attribute to this term. Starting from the prerogative term, a mythical story of Old Labour’s failed the nation has been constructed. The press headlines could indicate how the media tried to paint a picture: A classic symbol of the Winter of Discontent is the gravedigger’s strike, to which the Daily Mail reported “THEY WON’T EVEN LET US BURY OUR DEAD” at 1 Feb 1979. The title drew a line between the public and union members, and painted an aggressive villain picture of unions. Following suit, The Daily Mail coined “TARGET FOR TODAY – SICK CHILDREN” at 2 Feb 1979, while The Sun wrote “1000 Old Could Die Every Day” – depicting unions threatening lives of the elderly and the children. After inflaming anti-union sentiments, the media pointed to Jim Callaghan and Labour Party: “‘Crisis, what Crisis?’ seemed to be Whitehall’s nonchalant response to the Premier’s movements. … he can afford to make the most of his junket in the tropics.” This classic article depicted an incompetent PM on holiday when the nation was on crisis. This myth certainly was established. (Destructive Construction) Researchers overwhelmingly reported strong negative attitudes towards the unions and Old Labour, stating “Britain had been collapsing in the 1970s; Labour and the unions were to blame; and Thatcher was the saviour.” (myth, pp.9)

After the successful establishment of a failed Labour government in the election campaign, Thatcherites constantly invoked the memory of the Winter of Discontent to gain public support. At the 1985 Conservative Party Conference, Margret Thatcher herself made reference to this story to her audience during her speech:

Do you remember the Labour Britain of 1979? It was a Britain — in which union leaders held their members and our country to ransom; — A Britain that still went to international conferences but was no longer taken seriously; — A Britain that was known as the sick man of Europe; — And which spoke the language of compassion but which suffered the winter of discontent.

The Thatcherite, drew the Winter of Discontent as the prime example of their story of Old Labour failing the nation. As James Thomas observed, this construction gave Thatcherism a “silent majority” in discrediting all alternatives. (the myth, Pp.209)

Once the Thatcherite version of myth was widely accepted by public, there was no room for “Old” Labour anymore. To make themselves “electable”, New Labour had to accept the myth, and denounce their past. New Labour intentionally avoids mentioning of its past. The implication of it is the Old Labour is perceived as failures which needed to be concealed. (Old Labour, New Labour, p308) In the 1997 Labour manifesto, the foundational piece of New Labour, it was simply declared: “new Labour is new”. In his biography, Tony Blair made little reference to Old Labour, and when mentioning, constantly referred to the good old Attlee years. A rare expression for his attitude towards the blurred image of Old Labour was:

I had realised the Labour problem was self-made and self-induced. We were not in touch with the modern world. … The days of the old trade unionists were passing, along with many of the industries that they dominated – coal, steel, shipbuilding, textiles. The new industries – in particular those driven by emerging technologies, and modern service industries – were not attracted by the trade union mixture of industrial agitation and politics. … They didn’t feel: change or die. (Blair, pp.96~97)

The story of a “out-dated” Old Labour flowed naturally into the rhetoric of Thatcherism, when Thatcher came out to save Britain from Old Labour disasters like the Winter of Discontent. Tony Blair certainly accepted that Thatcher made much-needed reform. In his dubious words, New Labour was “a progressive alternative to Conservative rule”, instead of a successor of the Old Labour Party. (Blair, pp.15)

From those clues, a conclusion could be reached that the “newness” of New Labour was based upon a rejection of its past, therefore an adoption of Thatcherite myths dominant in British public.

Conclusion

Reviewing upon the previous sections, a general picture may be depicted: The Winter of Discontent was a major policy failure of the Old Labour, therefore inspiring New Labour to reflect and take on generally different policies; Old Labour policies also led to a point of “mutual divorce” between unions and the party. The divorce with unions, central to Old Labour party structure, necessitated reforms into New Labour; The Winter of Discontent formed as a basis for a Thatcherite myth of unelectable Old Labour, necessitating Labour to rebrand itself into New Labour.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Winter of Discontent directly influenced New Labour, in terms of policies and public image; while the structural reforms into New Labour were influenced by and influencing the Winter of Discontent.

《巴黎的忧郁》

Before the before

I have written the text below as a front matter for a recollection of events unfolded at Paris. However, as I have lately discovered, the front matter is far more valuable than the actual article itself. I decided to include only the front matter for now. Another reason for this act may be the adoption of the story into my PS for college application. This made me feel that the story can no longer be told in the tones I aspire, as my original story calls for mental pureness. Therefore here’s the foreword for the article titling Le Spleen De Paris.

Special thanks to Winston for translation of the text, however I must note that he modified the original text during translation.

写在前面

我下定决心要记录一段自导自演的戏剧。对这一词汇的使用来源于我们对于莎士比亚的误读，因此我在此处指出我误读出的含义：我在情感的演进中故意用书面语自言自语，因为我知道在我未来的人生中我注定会想起此刻并记录。我的记录从而成为了一场戏剧的落幕，一场记叙过去的时刻的戏剧的落幕。对当下的记录使得过去的瞬间变得具有前因后果。这一戏谑的态度看似是虚伪和做作的，可我不想说我不真诚，因为当代赋予我们的早熟性使我们不可避免地把生活变成一场戏剧，把我们自己变成戏剧的主角。我们思绪所处的空间好似一片被污染的海洋，其中充斥着排泄出的过剩信息，思绪就好比蓝藻，浸泡在营养过剩的海洋中使其爆发为赤潮。（我故意使用赤潮这一不高明的双关语，但这一赤潮不再是马克思主义的浪漫想象，而是生物学的事实。）正是在戏剧中，伴随着我们意识到我们生活的虚伪，我们必定要如同骑士一般的夺回生活的真实。我相信诸位都会想起堂吉诃德向风车的冲锋，那么就让我使用这个意象作为例子：堂吉诃德的行为乍一看是戏剧性的，事实上在一开始也的确如此，然而随着故事的推进，塞万提斯不可避免地意识到堂吉诃德荒唐的行为恰巧蕴含着真实，那么堂吉诃德的冲锋变成了真正的冲锋，比现实中的骑士更加真诚。于是我恳请我自己和诸位不要把这场戏剧当成单纯的高中生式的幻想，尽管这也无妨，但是我依旧确信我们能从中找到骑士的勇气。

Foreword

Again, Special thanks to Winston for translation of the text, however I must note that he modified the original text during translation.

I find it true to my heart that I will in time come to conceive my own work of my own design and of my own production. Mayhaps such a newfound passion is born off of my hopeless misinterpretation of Shakespeare’s concepts and his style: I may use formal utterances to twist my proceedings of faith and ardor, rigid in the belief of my own memorability and my future laboring. I hope in truth, as I scribe down the course of my life, if I ever do, it will be as I stand over the precipice of the primordial void, and thus as such a catalogue would surely be at the moment this play of life makes its curtain call, that everything would be illuminated in an instant. I refrain to point out my incredulity, but the early ripening society has enforced upon the individual inevitably turns the life and the past and the now into a satirical farce, tragedies and comedies of our own making, with every one of us as a protagonist. The projections of the mind seem to be close in resemblance of that red tide which is the explosion of Cyanobacteria in nutrient-full waters, overflowing the bounds of the human imagination into the realms of reality. In the throes of artistic expression, we are hit with the loss of what is genuine in life, and therefore we must take up the mantle of the heralds of originality. I believe such an analogy warrants the allusion to the symbol charge of Don Quixote against the looming giant of his imagination. His dreams of heroism and adversity may appear to be dramatic and unreciprocated in the context of our everyday lives. It seems this way in the story too, yet, as the story proceeds and the urges to charge against the imaginary enemy intensifies, Cervantes recognized an inevitability: Don Quixote’s charges are rooted in the protection of what is real. Therefore, his charges, once whimsical and fantastical, have become courageous in every sense of the word, even more so than any real knight in all of history. I implore myself and dear sires not to degrade such aspirations as the baseless spiritual ideal of a squabbling adolescent, and yet I profess that I would not be much bothered if one were to dismiss it as such, for we might find the audacity of Don Quixote in every one of us.

Is peace in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip possible?

Slavoj Žižek once told a joke that Palestinians and Israelis could only finally find peace, if a meteor hits Earth and wipes out the human race, but then they would not, because they would still be fighting in Hell, and in the Afterlife. Interestingly, researcher Avi Shilon commented that Israelis and Palestinians “cling to their particularistic claims to the land until the very moment they ascend to heaven.”[i] This response reveals how entrenched the imbroglio in Palestine is. In this age of renewed war in Gaza, peace still appears to be distant. Naturally, we ask: Is peace possible?

A meaningful response to this prompt should base on past and current characteristic of Palestinian conflicts. First, as conventional wisdom would suggest, “Everything is possible”. Therefore, “possibility of peace” should only be discussed within a predictable timeframe; Second, even if a major unprecedented change in world order occurs, it may not hugely impact Palestine. The Palestinian conflict is resistant to changes: From the British Mandate, through the Cold War, and to the modern era, peace hasn’t come to Palestine.[ii] The author argues in this essay that, in foreseeable future, there’s a narrow chance to achieve peace in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In this essay, East Jerusalem will be included as part of the West Bank, as the status of East Jerusalem is always a major issue for peacemaking; And, following the widely adopted two-state paradigm, “Palestine” was used to refer to “the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” for simplicity. Inevitably, a proper investigation into Palestine would involve Israel. Peace in Palestine should be achieved with a peace in Israeli-Palestinian conflict and domestic peace inside Palestine.

A consistent definition of peace must be settled in advance if any possibility of “peace” is to be discussed in depth. A fitting description would be the concept of “positive peace”, which “includes not only the absence of direct violence but also the absence of structural violence”.[iii] For here, “positive peace” was examined through both realist and idealist lens. In realist sense, peace hasn’t been achieved yet in the West Bank, for the systematical oppression of West Bank Arabs didn’t bring peace, but led to the First and the Second Intifada. In idealist sense, most people would agree that the oppressive system in the West Bank wasn’t morally correct and should be deemed as “peace”.

Having decided the criteria of what state of affairs is to be considered “peace”, what the result of such a settlement will come to needs to be addressed thoroughly. The possibilities posed before the international community are a one-state solution and a two-state one, the latter of which is conceivably much more achievable. Due to the fact that the state of Israel has a stable and vigorously functioning government body, whereas Palestine has none in the service of the Palestinian people, a one-state solution would most likely present itself as the transformation of an Israel solely for the Jews to a Israel with a multiethnic state body for a multiethnic society. But this situation would understandably result in the discrimination against the Arab population. Even Israeli hardliners opposing this label openly admit lack of Arab rights inside Israel.[iv] On the other hand, the ideal paradigm of a two-state solution also suffered from an exhibiting gallery of past failures. Yet it has more or less been adopted by both sides as the only realistically feasible solution in this conflict. In fact, it was so much of an ideal model that it ultimately turned the fight for existence to a fight for defining the borders of the Palestinian nation.[v] Therefore, the consensus for a two-state solution is one vital factor favoring peace, and shouldn’t simply be discarded only by observing failure to achieve two-state paradigm currently.

In the process of identifying factors, Kenneth Waltz’s “System – State – Individual” paradigm was followed.[vi] By examining individual factors, we may come to conclusion.

On the international scale, the presence of a mediator between the ever-conflicting views of Israelis and Palestinians would help bridge the gap between the two sides’ refusal to negotiation and significantly boost the peacemaking process. Unfortunately, no sovereign nation or international organization is adequate to be present as an effective mediator. The efforts of such overarching organizations such as the UN or the Arab League is only efficiently effective when the sentiment towards the goal of peacemaking is unanimous within the group, or else their efforts and promises fall short and only contributes to building the momentum for peace, but can provide no immediate results. The prospect of a Great Power acting as a mediating force in the region is also quite bleak, as ever since the beginning of the 20th century, multiple world powers have all tried to intervene in the situation in Palestine and failed to achieve a desirable outcome. The British Mandate imposed a “peace of empire” by colonial force, yet failed against agitated nationalist sentiments and the Cold War saw USA and USSR vying for power, often times escalating and exacerbating the conflicts rather than quell them. After the USSR’s collapse in 1991, America’s moment of global hegemony made her the ideal candidate for stepping in as a mediating force.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is, to a large extent, a war of narratives. The extent of this disparity in narratives can be best illustrated by the often conflicting views by different sources cited by this essay. The outside world didn’t help bridge the gap but only fuel misunderstandings between two sides. The opinions described across the globe provided the two sides – the Israelis and Palestinians evidences and support to deepen their bilateral misunderstandings. As we would discuss later, the misunderstanding was a major obstacle to peace. More directly, the high global attentions upon Israel and Palestine fueled them with more clashes. For instance, The JRA came to Palestine, to serve a purpose of aiding justice, but they only fueled the conflict through laying terrorist attacks upon innocent civilians.[vii] In summary, this war of narratives has long been stuck in a worsening deadlock[viii], and thereby a major obstacle for any attempts at peace.

The fundamental characteristic of the Middle East international system is anarchy. A vicious cycle could be explored: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict destabilized the Middle East, and the chaos in Middle East prolonged the conflict, in turn. Millions of refugees were exiled due to the conflict, and refugees triggered social problems in neighboring states. Palestinian refugees were crucial to outbreak of civil wars in Jordan and Lebanon. Refugees were armed, unemployed and separated from mainstream local society, therefore a hotbed for social unrest. Palestine has irreversibly damaged the Israeli-Arab relationship. In the past, four Arab-Israeli wars have broken out; Currently, the Israel-Hamas war has slowed normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel.[ix] The anarchical nature of the Middle East left their Palestinian ‘brothers’ in a stalemate, for Muslims would unite against an outright Israeli aggression, but their own infighting prevented them from furthering Palestinian interests against a united Israel; The instability of the Middle East rendered a ‘siege mentality’ for Israel, where Israelis saw themselves as a ‘hold of civilization’ in the mess of the Middle East. Such mentality contributed to Israeli isolation, which as previously shown would not bring peace. A meaningful development was a trend of decrease of importance of Israeli-Palestinian politics in the Middle East international system. This can be seen in the normalization of relationship between Arabs and Israelis.

The religious differences of the Israeli and Palestinian nations are unfavorable to peacemaking. Faith has been fundamental to Middle Eastern nationhood, including that of Israel and Palestine. In the drawing of borders in Jerusalem, a holy capital to both nations, pragmatic calculations for peace were usurped by religious divisions over the question of The Temple Mount. During the 2000 Second Camp David Summit, Clinton told Arafat that “You couldn’t have dreamt of this! (Palestinian sovereignty of the Haram) You missed an opportunity in ’47 when you opposed the partition . . . and now again!?” In response to Clinton’s critique as an outsider, Arafat responded “As I promised my people—We’ll liberate Jerusalem! If not now, perhaps in another thousand years.”[x] This would remain a major obstacle to a two-state solution in the decades to come. Arafat’s allusion to “another thousand years” revealed us that the Israelis and Palestinians both grew to believe “time is on our side” based on a religious worldview. This worldview rendered a contemporary peacemaking as a betrayal of ancestors and the nation. The obstacle of peacemaking would hardly change, for a worldview of a nation is hardly changeable.

The historical differences lead to an entrenched lack of understandings between Israelis and Palestinians. The history of fighting makes a significant number of politicians deemed each other as untrustworthy. As Shamir, a Likud leader described, “The sea is the same sea, the Arabs are the same Arabs”.[xi] The ideological disagreement between two sides was a major obstacle to peace. A counter-argument must be made, for recent years saw a growing bilateral understanding. The newer generation of historians started to provide the perspective of their opponents, especially the “New Historians” of Israel.[xii] Should this recognition grew, a major foundation for conciliation between two sides might be made.

The constant trend of favoring hawkish policies in political history of Israel and Palestine isn’t suitable for peace. In Israel, there is a gradual and steady turn to the political right. The support rate for the Israeli leftists has been in steady decline, from majority at foundation to current irrelevance. The hardliner rightist Likud party has dominated the later Israeli politics, but is falling out of favor against far-right hardliners. A pursue for eventual two-state peace has always been in the left’s agenda, while the right pursued domination over Palestinians. This could be attributed to a self-fulfilling prophecy: The Israeli right could always easily gain popularity through painting a negative image Palestine and then bringing it out of the Palestinians through their hawkish and oppressive policies. The Israeli left, with a central policy of normalizing Israeli relations with Palestine and Muslim states, fell into a gradual decline due to failure of peacemaking. The rise of the Likud was in the background of Israeli military successes, showing that the failure of current peacemaking would badly influence future peacemaking.[xiii] Similarly, the misery of generations of Palestinians has prompted revanchist militant groups dominating in Palestine. During the Cold War era, the major militant group was PLO among Palestinian diaspora; After the failed Oslo process, the major militant group was Hamas, an Islamist resistance movement in the self-governing Gaza Strip.

Leaders’ roles, during the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, were generally a secondary factor. To make peace in Palestine, fundamental changes must be adopted. A leader willing to implement such changes was therefore almost a necessity for any possible peace. But clearly, leaders must follow the domestic political agenda in general, because of strong political fanaticism. For instance, Rabin’s ambitious pursuit in the Oslo process was halted by his assassination. In the rightward political trend we discuss, it would be harder to find a political leader willing to take the risk, even a life risk, for peacemaking. The willingness of individual leaders, however, is random. Therefore, there is possibility for strongman figures to push for peace effectively, but the possibility is low at the moment.

Most factors, systemic, national and individual, were still acting against peacebuilding in Palestine in foreseeable future, though they may not remain so forever. Although the essay paints a grim picture, the author wants to stress that: Despite a dim chance of peace, our illogical and perhaps irrational belief in peace would be an advantage of achieving peace, transcending the confines of narrative control and the brutal realism of realpolitik. To raise possibility of peace, we can embrace diverse perspectives, and in doing so beginning to ease the deadlock of the rhetoric war, and by extension, the Israeli-Palestine conflict and every single person’s voice counts.

Bibliography

Araon David Miller. “Lost in the Woods: A Camp David Retrospective.” Accessed July 5, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/07/lost-in-the-woods-a-camp-david-retrospective?lang=en.

Aron, Raymond. “The Anarchical Order of Power.” Daedalus 95, no. 2 (1966): 479–502.

Barnett, Michael N., Nathan J. Brown, Marc Lynch, and Shibley Telhami, eds. The One State Reality: What Is Israel/Palestine? Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023.

Benn, Aluf. “The End of the Old Israel: How Netanyahu Has Transformed the Nation.” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016): 16–27.

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Friedman, Brandon, and Joshua Krasana. “Between Swords of Iron and the Al Aqsa Deluge: The Regional Politics of the Israel-Hamas War - Foreign Policy Research Institute.” Accessed July 9, 2024. https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/11/between-swords-of-iron-and-the-al-aqsa-deluge-the-regional-politics-of-the-israel-hamas-war/.

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Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485–507.

Kumaraswamy, P. R. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Ringside View. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2023.

Kuriyama, Yoshihiro. “Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and a ‘New Left’ Group in Japan.” Asian Survey 13, no. 3 (1973): 336–46. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643041.

Linfield, Susie. The Lions’ Den: Zionism and the Left from Hannah Arendt to Noam Chomsky. New Haven (Conn.): Yale university press, 2019.

Lustick, Ian. Paradigm Lost: From Two-State Solution to One-State Reality. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019.

Olmert, Josef. Review of Review of The Decline of the Left Wing in Israel: Yossi Beilin and the Politics of the Peace Process, by Avi Shilon. Middle East Journal 74, no. 3 (2020): 473–75.

Rais, Faiza R. “The Downfall of the Labour Party in Israel.” Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (2005): 129–50.

Shilon, Avi. The Decline of the Left Wing in Israel: Yossi Beilin and the Politics of the Peace Process. London: I.B. Tauris, 2020.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

[i] Shilon, The Decline of the Left Wing in Israel, 4.

[ii] Aly, Feldman, and Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis, 1257–93.

[iii] Fiala, “Pacifism.”

[iv] Dowty, The Israel/Palestine Reader, 437–43.

[v] Aly, Feldman, and Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis, 453–69.

[vi] Waltz, Man, the State, and War.

[vii] Kuriyama, “Terrorism at Tel Aviv Airport and a ‘New Left’ Group in Japan.”

[viii] Linfield, The Lions’ Den, 21.

[ix] Friedman and Krasana, “Between Swords of Iron and the Al Aqsa Deluge.”

[x] Shilon, The Decline of the Left Wing in Israel, 5.

[xi] Shilon, 8.

[xii] Aly, Feldman, and Shikaki, Arabs and Israelis, 1319–20.

[xiii] Rais, “The Downfall of the Labour Party in Israel.”

二零二三年六月二十四日 北海在翻滚而蒸腾的夜晚 很好的夜

那天早上，瓦格纳在向罗斯托夫挺近，我则在北京闷热的早上品味着看人死亡的快感。

我双手颤抖，在徐家汇站如此回忆。

惊恐的脸庞，惊恐的脸庞，黄色的铁椅，黄色的铁椅……

我到底是犯了什么罪行，叫我在二零二三年在国贸数着幽闭的列车，在二零二四年在徐家汇数着灯光昏黄的列车？

无数张玻璃反射出我丑恶的面庞，以及好像忽视了我，在拥吻的年轻情侣。

机械的声音在那里重复着 Middle Huaihai Road, Middle Huaihai Road。我想起十几年前，这声音就在我的童年重复；而在我的整个未来的生命中，机械的空洞声音。

孩子在人民广场尖叫，让我想起我在万体馆看到灯光闪烁而尖叫。

我对面惊恐的脸庞，我对面惊恐的脸庞，玻璃中我丑恶的面庞，玻璃中我丑恶的面庞……

我跑不了。

在这时，我已经醒悟，我会在北京郊外的混凝土与砖头的荒原中被枪毙。

不，你不配。我站在我自己的对面，面色惊恐地说道。你大概只配绞刑。

我想，北京，我亲爱的故乡，迟早有一天会杀掉我的。

二零二四年六月二十四日 上海地铁一号线列车 不知怎的换了三列都是灯光昏暗的车遂作

简评上海书城改造

“上海的史诗”——这是建筑师给自己的作品的评价。

如果有什么词汇能够概括我对这次改造的评价的话，那么应该是在建筑师先生的评价里面剔除掉两个重复音节“shi shi”中的一个，然后再取第三声。

建筑师在自己的改造计划中声明，改造后的上海书城不是给有读书爱好的人的，而是给沉迷于抖音的当代人。这听上去的确是有意义的一种教化，可惜他的设计更像是把这个空间降格成了纯粹的抖音景物。

该如何描述我的失望呢？就让我从一个楼层说起。原先六楼地方是摆着各种儿童绘本的，现在给改成了放二次元插画集的地方——我不是说不该摆点兔原画集或是123罗德岛，这是这真是一个书店该放在如此显眼的地方吗？况且，《原神》插画集被摆在人来人往的过道之上，而你得绕过去，才能在《原神》背后那个位置看到莎士比亚的画像和张国荣的《霸王别姬》剧照。这就是我们当代的文化艺术水准吗？

有人读到这里会说，你又开始反二了！那么就让我举出另一个例子：最能够突出这场改造的降格效果的，莫过于遍布于这个书店的高耸书架——如果一个书店想要真卖书的话，一排二层楼高又没有梯子的书架显然是没啥大用的。

有人会说，我说的问题上海书城本来就有——柜台、补习机构甚至密室都占着书城的不少空间，至于难以够到的顶层书架也是一直都有，而选书的话也确实称不上优秀。事实上，正如建筑师先生自己所说，“最大的挑战是对抗被美化的记忆”。的确，这些问题都是有的，我打小就觉得这书店早需要改造了。但是问题是一个二十一世纪二零年代的设计竟然改进不了一个前互联网的设计的缺点。

有什么东西能最好的概括景观呢？我想是某一层的“达利餐厅”——我实在是不理解，一个平凡到不能再平凡的西餐厅是如何能一边“chill”一边“tribune to Dali”一边“travelling surreal”（这都是餐厅自己印在上面的）；但是考虑到这个餐厅的顾客吃着能量碗的时候会感到自己在向超现实主义大师致敬，我想这何尝不是现代艺术想达成的一种效果？

不管如何，倒是有些传统被保留下来了——五楼的过道里，倒是完好如初地铺着一沓沓《走向成功》、《领先一步：文化课强化训练》、《202x上海中/高考英语词汇》。

当我走出“上海的史（诗）”的时候，我感到我童年又有一部份永远地被甩下来了。

当我还小的时候，那会儿四十二路还能到外滩，福州路就像福州一样遥远。我在书城逼仄且照明不足的黑色后廊里面拿了几本我其实看不懂的历史书或是经典小说出来，坐在国画书店橱窗底下的抛光花岗石上，等待四十九路公交车，望着里面的绘画，那时，我相信我在很遥远的未来——遥远到连图景也没有，只剩一片光明，我总有一天能够走进去。

说来也怪，即便刚刚出来，书城一楼留在我脑海里面的，不是现在这白粉色的商品展示柜，而是原先那岩石和金属字的冰冷，挑高的中庭，有些污损的石头地板和一排排畅销书——在那里面，我第一次埋下了对“畅销”感到愤世嫉俗的种子。我小时候的那个楼，已经带着它的许多细节留在我脑海里面了。

那么，就让这遗少的缅怀消逝吧。我坚信这里的生命力是杀不死的——哪怕再过了五十年，福州路应该还是会有新的孩子站在一排排书架下，陶醉在他不理解的世界里。

我之所以在此写下这样几句不无道理的废话^[1]，不过是为了解释今日的感受——姑且称之为“感伤”。

强迫溢出在我的整个生活里面，把我的生活和我的人格变成了供别人所打分和批判的商品，实在是叫我沮丧。我一面把玩着颓丧的思想，一面感受着写作时所压制的情感。被理性的堤坝所积蓄起来的，对阿非利卡的血泪的高中生式的激情向我袭来。

恐惧和疲惫，让我决意去小说中寻找些许慰藉。

我兴冲冲地冲进书店里，计划是拿走几本恋爱小说，最终却发现手上捧着一本“不可腐蚀者”的传记，然后是《利奥波德二世国王的鬼魂》。

我靠在沙发上，背后是别墅的墙，而面前就是过道了。我开始断断续续地读起来了：藏在重重意识形态的包裹与废墟之后，高贵的道德与炙热的灵魂，热月八日孤注一掷的自杀以及热月九日的自杀未遂，未完成的签名，共和历下协和广场的断头台，冰冷的死亡数据，清醒、悲愤、才华横溢但却无力回天的非洲国王，数十张断了手脚的人的照片，柏林和布鲁塞尔的辉煌歌剧院，罗马孤独和漫长阳光下的走狗，即将变成大刽子手的美国记者^[2]……

正当我好像要想出什么情感的时候，面前来的保洁员开始高声^[3]地说起关于工作的事情来，然后旁边的店员竟然就跟她攀谈了起来。于是我注意起书店里嘈杂的一切：

孩子大声地敲击着地板走着；中年夫妇匆忙地逛了一圈，也隆隆作响地走着；至于我所最反感的，还是那些穿着光鲜亮丽的家伙，高傲地噼啪作响的走着，用余光低看了几眼书架，便掏出手机来摆出各种姿势的拍照。

庸俗的空间！我在心里这么说。书架上摆的，是对暴行的控诉，可人们只从这个书架中得到了朋友圈里面的照片，得到了上海初夏的景色，得到了沾沾自喜的情感——这话不单是对我面前的人说的，更是对我自己的控诉。我不过也就是一个看客罢了！^[4]

归根到底，也没有人在乎今天的刚果是怎么样——前几日我还读到新的关于刚果的屠杀的报道，还是在我吃晚饭的时候读的。那时候，我也并没有感到不适，在心里谴责了几下自己的麻木不仁，又投入到吃饭的事业当中去了。

我好像再一次杀死了他们。每一位读者在读完这本书后，都再次断掉了数万刚果人的手脚，将不可计数的冤魂溺死在大洋底的荒漠之中。^[5]

一股嫌恶涌了上来，我把书塞了回去，然后快步地离开了这一切。走到门口的时候，阳光重新的出现：而我一定是觉得这盛大的阳光是如此的丑恶和残酷，以至于我喃喃着“Gatsby is dead”^[6]，便摆着一幅杀了人的家伙应有的肃穆的神色，从挤着拍照的游客当中过去了。

于是我匆匆的扫了一辆车，就回到了永远不缺景观与景观社会^[8]的，周六下午的卢湾区的街道上。^[9]

倘若诸君真有功夫读到这里，那么就让我再多啰嗦一句，这句话我自认是概括了这几千个字符的意思的：尽管我如何伪装生活的美好，在漫长的黑夜里，被社会的规训所压制住的，无数冤死而面目全非的灵魂就要来走进我的良夜：面对在冰冷的铁栏杆上反射出来的、被LED污染过的月光，痉挛着的肉体提醒着我这一点。^[10]

To what extent did the diplomatic policies of Thatcher’s cabinet result in the successful signing of the Lancaster House Agreement?

The Lancaster House Agreement settled the ‘Rhodesian Question’ which has lasted for two decades. The ‘Rhodesian Question’ concerns the status of the British colony South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)[1], a country with a sizable white minority ruling over the black majority. The whites are unwilling to give up their political and social privileges to a ‘majority rule’ (essentially black rule), triggering a guerilla war (known as The Rhodesian Bush War) between black guerillas, namely ZANU and ZAPU, and white government forces.

With the tide turning against Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, was sworn in as the first elected black Rhodesian PM in June 1979. Muzorewa hoped to achieve majority rule through an ‘internal settlement’, though his regime was still heavily dependent on white minorities.

The Thatcher cabinet hoped to resolve the Rhodesian Question by introducing majority rule. As Jeffery Davidow has evaluated, “The major British objective, simply put, was to remove the Rhodesian problem as a constant thorn in the United Kingdom’s side.” Legally still a colony of Great Britain, the Rhodesian regime agitated all African states and some third-world countries due to their suppression of blacks. Britain, therefore, also took the blame for irresponsibility. As Carrington explained, ‘recognition of the Bishop’s regime would have led to the most appalling problems.’[i] Believing a simple recognition of the current Rhodesian government wouldn’t work, the British statesmen set the stage for an all-party peace conference in Lancaster House.

The successful signing of the Lancaster House Agreement referred to the fact that: Three delegations in the conference all signed upon the final agreement. The British goal of introducing majority rule was met, [ii] and the almost two-decades-long imbroglio, especially the decade-long guerilla war was ended by the singing of the Lancaster House Agreement.

The Pre-conference British policies helped to achieve successful signing in the Lancaster House Agreement. The main architect behind the Lancaster House Conference was Lord Peter Carrington, the Conservative foreign secretary of the Thatcher cabinet. Carrington, with the support of the British diplomats, proposed a solution to the Rhodesian Question by bringing majority rule. His pre-conference efforts brought support for British efforts from black Africans, the United States, and South Africa. In the Lusaka Communique of the Commonwealth in 1979, Commonwealth statesmen insisted on ‘legal independence to Zimbabwe based on majority rule’ and also ‘call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited’.[iii] The conference would be the Lancaster House Conference. The Lusaka Communique also earned support for British peacemaking efforts from Commonwealth nations, notably Zambia, the host of the Lusaka Conference producing the Communique, and also the largest supporter of ZANU. The May 21st meeting of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington resulted in Americans leaving ‘running rooms’ for the British to maneuver, while still supporting a peace talk.[iv] South Africa is another key actor appeased by Britain. Through ‘reassuring’ South Africans, the final jigsaw of a successful peace agreement is finished.[v] As Ian Smith would complain, ‘with Carrington and Pik Botha and Jimmy Carter working together for the same objectives, the dice were loaded’[vi]. Indeed, the British managed to gain support from every outsider to support their plans for a peace agreement. On the other hand, the British camp still had fractures among themselves. Prime Minister Margret Thatcher and the Tory right backbenchers vocally supported the cause of Rhodesian whites, led by Ian Smith. In the 1979 Conservative Party Manifesto, Thatcher’s cabinet ‘has the duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality, move to lift sanctions, and do its utmost to ensure that the newly independent state gains international recognition’[vii] [viii]. Thatcher herself and her ideological allies of the Tory right are obliged to recognize the Muzorewa government, a move against the well-carved British agenda of Carrington. And as Ian Smith would describe, ‘Our Conservative Party friends in London were consistent in their support.’[ix] The Tory right was determined to support their friends Ian Smith and Rhodesian whites. Though the Tory right failed to influence peace talks in the end, their potential to disrupt a majority rule agreement should not be dismissed.

During the conference, the British diplomatic tactic resulted in the successful signing of the Lancaster House peace conference. As Preston would evaluate, ‘the skill and resources that Lord Carrington as mediator brought to the table’ was the in-conference factor resulting in the signing.[x] Three main tactics were identified by Davidow as ‘critical to the conference’s ultimate success’[xi]. The foremost tactic was to strongly manage the conference. As Lord Soames, a prominent British diplomat noted, ‘The role adopted by the British Government was always to guide the negotiations from the general to the particular.’[xii] British drafts would serve as the basis for discussions, and then Carrington would ask two African delegations to modify it, until an acceptable deal has been made. The ‘guide’ tactic naturally facilitates another tactic of British centrality. By gaining support from all parties and marginalizing those who didn’t obey, the course of peace talks was under British control. Ian Smith complained that though he didn’t agree with Carrington, ‘He (Carrington) had more success, however, in persuading others to his … thinkings.’[xiii] Out of the Lancaster House, Carrington frequently visited all parties involved and tried to gain their support for British efforts. Ian Smith was then marginalized by the British, shown by the fact that he failed to provide details for late negotiations.[2] The British centrality tactic succeeded. The final important tactic was a step-by-step approach. The peace conference could be divided into three: first on the Constitution, second on the Transition, and third on the Ceasefire. By starting with easier topics like the Constitution (for Muzorewa and Mugabe all agreed upon ‘One Man, One Vote’ due to confidence in winning an election), the two African delegations had to choose between leaving the conference, thereby giving up previous efforts or agreed to terms put forward by the British. The three British tactics of guidance, British centrality, and step-by-step approach helped to facilitate the successful signing of the Agreement.

The stalemate status of the guerilla war in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe helped the successful signings of the Lancaster. Identified by Preston as a ‘hurting stalemate’[xiv], a battlefield stalemate left harmful influences in the economy, morales, and foreign support, pushing belligerents to a peace conference. In 1979, the government failed to clear guerillas out of the countryside, and the guerillas failed to storm governmental positions in towns and cities. The stalemate was harmful to Rhodesians. With the loss of vital Mozambique ports in 1975 and renewed guerilla offensives, the Rhodesian economy plummeted. As Robin Renwick has evaluated, ‘the war … was exerting the real pressure on the economy’. The budget deficit, from a low of R$2.4 million in 1975, spiraled to R$262.3 million in 1979.[xv] In turn, economic hardships led to shortages of military funding and then battlefield failures. The Rhodesian tactic of fortifying villages also failed, essentially leaving the country to guerillas. In 1979, 95% of Rhodesia was under martial law[xvi], showing guerillas attack across the nation. In a report of the Rhodesian Army in 1977, the Army recommended to ‘arrive at an early political settlement before the point of no return’.[xvii] Morales were low for Rhodesians: even Ian Smith admitted ‘declining confidence … in the long-term future of our country’.[xviii] The whites are almost forced to accept a deal. On the guerilla side, they recognized that the prospects for an early triumph in the field were also small.[xix] Twenty years of warfare exhausted Africans, both inside ZANU and ZAPU and outside in the neighboring states of Zambia and Mozambique.[xx] With threats to cut off aid, the Zimbabweans are willing to attempt a peace conference held by a third-party mediator, which is the Lancaster House Conference. A counter-argument could be made that war is continuable for belligerent sides. As Matthew Preston claimed, ‘there was no stalemate’, and military factor didn’t ‘helped determine… the achievement of it (the Lancaster House Agreement)’. For the guerillas, they believed they would win the war, for their continuous advances on the battlefield. The guerillas weren’t wholeheartedly in support of an agreement in the Lancaster House. For the government, the 1979 election that brought the first majority rule government was a ‘success beyond expectations’[xxi], for guerilla attempts to disrupt an election were repealed by the governmental forces guarding settlements, showing Rhodesian control for settlements was not waning. The Rhodesians could still fight the war should the Conference fail.

The author argued that, to a large extent, the British diplomatic policies were a major contributor to the successful signings of the Lancaster House Agreement, both before and during the conference, while other factors, for instance, battlefield stalemate, also helped to facilitate a peace agreement in Lancaster House. The Rhodesian imbroglio, which started in the 1960s, appeared to finally be resolved at Lancaster House. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe was still embroiled in crisis, and eventually, the state completely collapsed during the notorious hyperinflation in the late 1990s.

Bibliography

“1979 Conservative Party Manifesto - CONSERVATIVEMANIFESTO.COM.” Accessed May 16, 2024. http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1979/.

Cownie, David S. “The Transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The 1979 Lancaster House Conference.” Edited by Jeffrey Davidow. Africa Today 31, no. 4 (1984): 39–41.

Davidow, Jeffrey. A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979. London: Routledge, 2021.

Flower, Ken. Serving Secretly: Rhodesia’s CIO Chief on Record. Alberton: Galago, 1987.

Lancaster House Agreement. Accessed May 15, 2024. https://peacemaker.un.org/zimbabwe-lancaster-house-agreement79.

Matthews, Robert O. “From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Prerequisites of a Settlement.” International Journal 45, no. 2 (1990): 292–333. https://doi.org/10.2307/40202673.

Meredith, Martin. The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890-1979. London: Pan Books, 1980.

Onslow, Sue. “‘Noises off’: South Africa and the Lancaster House Settlement 1979-1980.” Journal of Southern African Studies 35, no. 2 (2009): 489–506.

Preston, Matthew. “Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed.” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 1 (2004): 65–83.

Sibanda, Eliakim. “Zimbabwe’s Independence: The Role of Diplomacy.” Edited by Michael Charlton. Africa Today 39, no. 1/2 (1992): 157–58.

Smith, Ian D. Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence. London: John Blake Publishing Ltd, 2008.

“The Lusaka Communique, Commonwealth Heads of Government, August 1979, on Rhodesia.” African Affairs 79, no. 314 (1980): 115–115.

[1] The names ‘Rhodesia’ and ‘Zimbabwe’ refer to the same land: the former is used by whites, and the latter is used by blacks. In this essay, the author would employ wording according to the context.

[2] Ian Smith didn’t attend the conference after he cast the only ‘no’ vote over the Constitution issue. See Smith, 486-496*.*

[i] Jeffrey Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979 (London: Routledge, 2021), 35.

[ii] “Lancaster House Agreement,” accessed May 15, 2024, https://peacemaker.un.org/zimbabwe-lancaster-house-agreement79.

[iii] “The Lusaka Communique, Commonwealth Heads of Government, August 1979, on Rhodesia,” African Affairs 79, no. 314 (1980): 115–115.

[iv] Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979, 38.

[v] Sue Onslow, “‘Noises off’: South Africa and the Lancaster House Settlement 1979-1980,” Journal of Southern African Studies 35, no. 2 (2009): 489–506.

[vi] Ian D. Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence (London: John Blake Publishing Ltd, 2008), 484.

[vii] “1979 Conservative Party Manifesto - CONSERVATIVEMANIFESTO.COM,” accessed May 16, 2024, http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1979/.

[viii] Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890-1979 (London: Pan Books, 1980), 364.

[ix] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 479.

[x] Robert O. Matthews, “From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Prerequisites of a Settlement,” International Journal 45, no. 2 (1990): 318, https://doi.org/10.2307/40202673.

[xi] Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979, 49.

[xii] Davidow, 53.

[xiii] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 481.

[xiv] Matthew Preston, “Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 1 (2004): 320.

[xv] David S. Cownie, “The Transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The 1979 Lancaster House Conference,” ed. Jeffrey Davidow, Africa Today 31, no. 4 (1984): 73.

[xvi] Matthews, “From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,” 320.

[xvii] Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: Rhodesia’s CIO Chief on Record (Alberton: Galago, 1987), 189.

[xviii] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 354.

[xix] Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979, 64.

[xx] Eliakim Sibanda, “Zimbabwe’s Independence: The Role of Diplomacy,” ed. Michael Charlton, Africa Today 39, no. 1/2 (1992): 157–58.

[xxi] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 450.

献给两位我所熟知的女生

思想罪被立法通过那天，我坐在江边的一家餐厅同她吃饭。

她镇定地说：她要自杀。

我凝视着她的脸庞，暗自揣度她要是真的自杀后的情形。

我看着自己在想象和现实中道貌岸然地握紧双拳，激动地在她班里为她辩护。

丑恶的脸庞、我无可奈何的小市民心理、以及试图逃离庸俗的庸俗青年。

无可救药的自私自利！伪君子的可耻行为！

从愤世嫉俗中回来，

我考量了一下，根据这我既唾弃又尊崇的道德，到底该如何安排我的心理活动？

于是我叹了一口气，只能回复道：

事到如今，我还有何可说？

事到如今，我只希望“希望”这两个字能呼起一种勇气，被我们所赋予这两个字符的勇气。

二零二四年五月六日夜

后修改了一次，增加了斜体一句，以避免读者认为我看到哪一位熟人就思忖她要自杀。这不是完全事出无因的。

评论均指出：作者是不真诚的。

作者自述

不真诚的写作最为致命。我在写作的时候，无疑刻意注入了高中生的自怨自艾。刻意，便是一种不真诚。

小说想探讨的是“否定”。然而我在写作中愈发感到自己的精神和笔力均不能支撑这般的遐想。于是便到此为止了。

从这一目的来说，这否定性的自白也成了这小说的一部分。

审稿意见

这篇文章对党和国家的事业做出了恶毒的诋毁，充斥着小资产阶级的懦弱和呻吟。不适宜发表。请将文本抄送反革命分子肃反委员会。

苏维埃万岁！

38年

人民思想纯化委员会

38年1月。

夜晚从无宁静时分。炼钢厂彻夜的隆隆声填充了整座城市的夜空。漫天的雾霾啊——罩上了明亮的满月。每每到这个时候，我都会幻想起自然——然而我却想不出来。自然只是一个符号，我感受不到其中的内涵，因为我从未身处其中过。但一提起来自然，我就又能感受到一种情绪——似乎是程序式的、设定好的情绪。

我穿梭着街上，感到了喘不过气来——呛人的烟雾与铁一般寂寞而冰冷的混凝土，在我面前无尽的笔直而规整的延伸下去。无尽的方块是人类征服自然的象征——而我却对这伟大的名为“科技”和“理性”的进步感到疲惫，令我对自己感到作呕。

道路的尽头，是宏伟的雕塑。烈焰在雾霾中纷飞，照亮身后雕像的脸——鼻梁在脸上投下长长的阴影。我意识到我需要对祂的雕塑感到激情澎湃，我需要在我的心中唤醒那种光荣的情感，那种属于新时代的、属于新人的情感——不曾停歇的前进、不惜代价的前进，属于永恒的在无尽的海洋中无力地翻动的渺小的个人。

萧瑟的风，吹灭了我心中唤起的激情。刻意培育的情感是如此不堪一击，叫我吃惊。在混凝土的缝隙中打转的风，带起了巨大的响声，久久留在空旷的大道上。

我的记忆层层叠加，被褫夺了一切美好的过往，只留下来情感的碎片。祂的人的血肉的躯体和热烈的精神在死后被剥离了，留下的只有空洞而钢铁般坚硬的混凝土。

我惊叹于自己对自我感情掌控上的无能，然而我意识到我在感伤。感伤是不属于新人的、不属于新时代的。我如此确信着。于是我唾弃了自己的感伤，继续以坚定而欢快的步伐迈向名为家的日常——这是在大家都在倡导的走路方法。

我忽然又想起来了，这种刻意感也是不好的。我记得，曾有人倡导“自然生活运动”，那会儿满城的人都在斥责“不自然的人”——我当时心理就反反复复的惶恐：我尽是这般下作的人！

我尽力地走着，然而我愈发地想要自然，却愈发地不自然——正如同“自然生活运动”一般。运动的批评者们斥责大众又是刻意地追求“不自然的‘自然’”，叫我也心里发慌：即便有了伟大的运动指导，（这运动也已撕下其伟大的面具了），我竟然仍是这般下作的人！

想到这里，我的手抽搐了起来，因为玻璃又泛出了我的脸——我不知道从玻璃中泛出的我长什么样，我只知道记得清晨和夜晚，当凄凉的鸟叫传入狭小的浴室，从惨白的光中照出的我的丑恶的身姿——丑恶令人作呕。

“去掉渺小的个人！”我仍然记得街头那震耳欲聋的口号，因此我一想到我这令人作呕的令人作呕的反应，我不禁歌颂起了运动的伟大。

悲痛是属于过去的，悲痛是被属于被打败的社会的。胜利的极昼取代了蛮荒时代的永夜。不停涌动的进步没有悲伤的空间——悲伤是属于夜晚的，是在凄惨的月光照亮的灰黑的土地上的悲伤。

“这场小小的危险实验已经结束！”我骤然想起来了。那是早报上第一版的标题。

我恢复了片刻的平静，沿着道路走下去。

悲痛的回忆浸透了混凝土人行道上每一条人工的、笔直的以及重复的裂缝。裂缝被昏黄的灯光所笼罩。看着这些裂缝，我便能够想起往事，其在永远低垂的精神中的太阳照射下投下长长的阴影，笼罩我人生的过去、现在和未来。

然后，我的精神同我说：

你是即将要死的人，你的精神已经死亡。

然而，我深知已死的精神不应当能够讲话，这是不符合逻辑的，因此我从而推导出精神的不可知性，感叹于我引以为豪的理性的极限。

理性！自打我识字开始，我就被教导绝对的理性。说到底，我所认识的理性也不过是一个感性的图景罢了。在一个又一个令人恐惧的雨夜，我疲惫的身体难以胜任新时代的呼唤之时，我痛恨这为何机器不能取代我：机器不会疲惫、机器不会消耗宝贵的食物、机器不会感到多余的负面情绪。

不管如何，我的精神继续同我说：

你将要死去了。

我如同旁观者一般饶有趣味的看着我的死亡：花的凋谢和短暂使得生命之花变得愈发的美和珍贵。

于是，我唾弃起了我这旁观者的态度，因为我将要死了，而道德要求我们对死亡感到怜悯。

于是，我质问自己：为何叫道德束缚住我？

我的精神下意识地对自己说：不知怎的，我竟然想起来了死后的世界。我明深知这是不存在的。光荣的、伟大的唯物主义怎会这样……啊！我这身上无可回避的小资产阶级的劣根性啊！

我突然感到周围的一切都好像盯着我，就像公审大会上的人们一样。

批评与自我批评是进步的阶梯。

然而，我恐惧它；

所以，我恐惧进步。

我不敢再往下想了，这实在是令人作呕！

然而“不敢”本身难道也不是懦弱者的举措与借口吗？一如“令人作呕”也是令人作呕一般。

于是我抵达了名为“家”的可憎而可怖的大楼前面。

我已然确信：我只有奔向死亡，投入她冰冷又温暖的怀抱，才能使自己这微薄的生命力量燃烧于无边的骇人的黑夜里，让我仅存的价值最大化。这一刻，我终于感到了生命的饱满。我将以一种超然的姿态奔向那神圣的斗争。终于，我的生命将汇入那滚滚向前的进步的车轮。

我终于坚定地走起来了：我欢快的走向死亡。我走向死的幸福。

我的死亡是无价值的人的死！毋宁说，我这人生唯一的价值在于我的死亡！

幸福万岁！进步万岁！

黑夜里，一个乌黑的物体重重地砸在了冰冷的雪地上。旁边的地面上，闪烁着晶莹的光泽。

“这是？”

“那是水。”

“水？”

“是的，应该是自大的少年面向死亡，自我感动的泪吧。”

《水下之人》书评

英文名：Man Under the Water

作者：吕晓宇

出版日期：2023

初次听闻这本书，是在《忽左忽右》上吕晓宇来做客谈乌克兰战争时。程衍樑提到吕是带着新书来的。而吕大概是这么说的：

有些话，只能用虚构来写出来。

于是我买了这本小说。读完之后，我同意作者自己所陈述的。小说无疑指向的是作者本人在牛津的一年硕士经历，而虚构的体裁也不过是为了更好的呈现之。作者试图引入了第二条线，即一位未来的历史学家来重新发现“L”（很明显，就是作者本人）的往事。每一章对半分为两半：按时间推进的L的手记、及这位未来的历史学家与他的室友中的一位的口述史采访。然而这一遐想的未来世界呈现则略显奇怪：既像一个宏大的世界只从几个细节露出，又像作者根本并未细细考量这个未来的世界，仅为想象其同学的未来生活。

总之，我的购买也是为了这份“回忆录”。我时常想象我的大学生活，那2014年的牛津政治生的大学生活应当与我相差无几了。对于当下身处令人沮丧的高中的我，我希望理解我的大学生活是如何的：会如同高中一样令人沮丧？会面临无可适从的现实吗？

在读完全书后，我有了一个模糊的印象：依旧令人沮丧的大学和珍贵的同学。可悲者如我，的确无能建构起更详细的图景了。“水下之人”这一标题凝练了这群大学生们的特质，无需我的赘述。

作者呈现的论战倒也相当有趣。此处摘抄一些我圈画了的句子：

我们撞开门的时候，带进去一阵风，掀起散落在地板书架桌上的手稿，雪白的纸，自由飘在空中，乱无章法地落下。马可张开双臂，模仿耶稣在十字架上的场景，说，干，I’ve lost my plot！I’ve lost it！我说，把那瓶威士忌拿着，我们去划船，船上说。他说，Yes，punt away，punt into the ocean，put away from all my problems……我随手捡起一张手稿，开头一段，描写19世纪的传教士进入昏睡症袭扰的村庄，小说一般的文字，引人入胜。马可把它夺过来，捏成一团，抛向垃圾桶，没进，他说，我一无是处，一无是处。我把它捡起来，展开，放在桌子上说，明天你再看的时候，感觉也许就不同了。

我说，我们还没想清楚，想抵制资本主义，又想成为其中的一员。极尽功利地来，又极尽功利地走，我们当然都可能沦落成为Corporate Whores。亚历山大说，理想是世界青年的通病。听过读过的故事，让他们模糊产生了叫“理想”的模样。碰到事与愿违，就把阻碍视作“理想”的绊脚石。这些叫作现实的不如意，和理想的一帆风顺抽象地对立。我说，你说的是没经历的青年谈论的理想，他们容易在失望后回到可耻的现实主义。我要说的是只属于青年精神的冲劲，敢于挑战，敢于颠覆，敢于付诸实践。亚历山大说，不要忘了，我们之所以在这里，不是因为你口中的青年精神，而是因为我们是旧秩序的一员。我说，没错，所以革命的革命性，向来是推翻自己。旧的已死，新的痛不欲生。

他们接受进步论的观念，相信一个所谓的发展趋势，认为美好新世界就在前方，这样的人普遍经不住崩坏和苦难，一旦出现真实的面孔，他们要么扭过头去，唱起怀旧的腔调，要么，当没有选择，要赤裸裸地看着眼前的一切时，他们就不可避免地倒下。他没有能杀死别人的气质，当一切开始崩塌和相互毁坏的时候，每个人必须杀死点什么才能活下去，你要是下不去手就只能对自己动手。

他像是把字母切开，一个元音一个元音地，对我说，我们活在刺激过度、欲望过盛的时代，直到我们干干净净地，忘记真爱。我说，不要犯了普世主义者的谬误。我碰了碰他的酒杯。他说，我已经喝完了，不像你还在克制。

如上，我总的观点是：这本书值得将要或正在或已经同作者一样成为人文学科留学生的人来阅读。这是二十一世纪刚刚出现的一批人，因而这本书将成为对他们的生活珍贵的记录，让我们得以在现代的、后现代的时代中得以窥探和正视自我。

Lucy is dead.

当我读完这篇小说时，我正在西塘镇上的汉堡店里。那天应当是春游的，而我决心离开学校给我设立的’commercialized nothingness’(Ray语)，而去外面的’pure nothingness’(我说的)呆着。

不过到头来倒是和五六个人呆在一起。我挑了那汉堡店的户外位置，舒展在野营椅上，看着这个江南小镇奇怪的西化和时髦的空间。我背对着一条小路——那里便是嘈杂的三轮车，低矮的楼房的世界了。

我看着眼前的同学们，感到我夺回了半刻的清闲。于是我向后靠过去，再靠过去，看着金属质地的显示器、上面的奶白的小楼，以及更上面的，江南初春的天空。

以上。

二〇二四年三月二十四日 于上海图书馆