To what extent did the diplomatic policies of Thatcher’s cabinet result in the successful signing of the Lancaster House Agreement?
The Lancaster House Agreement settled the ‘Rhodesian Question’ which has lasted for two decades. The ‘Rhodesian Question’ concerns the status of the British colony South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)[1], a country with a sizable white minority ruling over the black majority. The whites are unwilling to give up their political and social privileges to a ‘majority rule’ (essentially black rule), triggering a guerilla war (known as The Rhodesian Bush War) between black guerillas, namely ZANU and ZAPU, and white government forces.
With the tide turning against Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, was sworn in as the first elected black Rhodesian PM in June 1979. Muzorewa hoped to achieve majority rule through an ‘internal settlement’, though his regime was still heavily dependent on white minorities.
The Thatcher cabinet hoped to resolve the Rhodesian Question by introducing majority rule. As Jeffery Davidow has evaluated, “The major British objective, simply put, was to remove the Rhodesian problem as a constant thorn in the United Kingdom’s side.” Legally still a colony of Great Britain, the Rhodesian regime agitated all African states and some third-world countries due to their suppression of blacks. Britain, therefore, also took the blame for irresponsibility. As Carrington explained, ‘recognition of the Bishop’s regime would have led to the most appalling problems.’[i] Believing a simple recognition of the current Rhodesian government wouldn’t work, the British statesmen set the stage for an all-party peace conference in Lancaster House.
The successful signing of the Lancaster House Agreement referred to the fact that: Three delegations in the conference all signed upon the final agreement. The British goal of introducing majority rule was met, [ii] and the almost two-decades-long imbroglio, especially the decade-long guerilla war was ended by the singing of the Lancaster House Agreement.
The Pre-conference British policies helped to achieve successful signing in the Lancaster House Agreement. The main architect behind the Lancaster House Conference was Lord Peter Carrington, the Conservative foreign secretary of the Thatcher cabinet. Carrington, with the support of the British diplomats, proposed a solution to the Rhodesian Question by bringing majority rule. His pre-conference efforts brought support for British efforts from black Africans, the United States, and South Africa. In the Lusaka Communique of the Commonwealth in 1979, Commonwealth statesmen insisted on ‘legal independence to Zimbabwe based on majority rule’ and also ‘call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited’.[iii] The conference would be the Lancaster House Conference. The Lusaka Communique also earned support for British peacemaking efforts from Commonwealth nations, notably Zambia, the host of the Lusaka Conference producing the Communique, and also the largest supporter of ZANU. The May 21st meeting of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington resulted in Americans leaving ‘running rooms’ for the British to maneuver, while still supporting a peace talk.[iv] South Africa is another key actor appeased by Britain. Through ‘reassuring’ South Africans, the final jigsaw of a successful peace agreement is finished.[v] As Ian Smith would complain, ‘with Carrington and Pik Botha and Jimmy Carter working together for the same objectives, the dice were loaded’[vi]. Indeed, the British managed to gain support from every outsider to support their plans for a peace agreement. On the other hand, the British camp still had fractures among themselves. Prime Minister Margret Thatcher and the Tory right backbenchers vocally supported the cause of Rhodesian whites, led by Ian Smith. In the 1979 Conservative Party Manifesto, Thatcher’s cabinet ‘has the duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality, move to lift sanctions, and do its utmost to ensure that the newly independent state gains international recognition’[vii] [viii]. Thatcher herself and her ideological allies of the Tory right are obliged to recognize the Muzorewa government, a move against the well-carved British agenda of Carrington. And as Ian Smith would describe, ‘Our Conservative Party friends in London were consistent in their support.’[ix] The Tory right was determined to support their friends Ian Smith and Rhodesian whites. Though the Tory right failed to influence peace talks in the end, their potential to disrupt a majority rule agreement should not be dismissed.
During the conference, the British diplomatic tactic resulted in the successful signing of the Lancaster House peace conference. As Preston would evaluate, ‘the skill and resources that Lord Carrington as mediator brought to the table’ was the in-conference factor resulting in the signing.[x] Three main tactics were identified by Davidow as ‘critical to the conference’s ultimate success’[xi]. The foremost tactic was to strongly manage the conference. As Lord Soames, a prominent British diplomat noted, ‘The role adopted by the British Government was always to guide the negotiations from the general to the particular.’[xii] British drafts would serve as the basis for discussions, and then Carrington would ask two African delegations to modify it, until an acceptable deal has been made. The ‘guide’ tactic naturally facilitates another tactic of British centrality. By gaining support from all parties and marginalizing those who didn’t obey, the course of peace talks was under British control. Ian Smith complained that though he didn’t agree with Carrington, ‘He (Carrington) had more success, however, in persuading others to his … thinkings.’[xiii] Out of the Lancaster House, Carrington frequently visited all parties involved and tried to gain their support for British efforts. Ian Smith was then marginalized by the British, shown by the fact that he failed to provide details for late negotiations.[2] The British centrality tactic succeeded. The final important tactic was a step-by-step approach. The peace conference could be divided into three: first on the Constitution, second on the Transition, and third on the Ceasefire. By starting with easier topics like the Constitution (for Muzorewa and Mugabe all agreed upon ‘One Man, One Vote’ due to confidence in winning an election), the two African delegations had to choose between leaving the conference, thereby giving up previous efforts or agreed to terms put forward by the British. The three British tactics of guidance, British centrality, and step-by-step approach helped to facilitate the successful signing of the Agreement.
The stalemate status of the guerilla war in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe helped the successful signings of the Lancaster. Identified by Preston as a ‘hurting stalemate’[xiv], a battlefield stalemate left harmful influences in the economy, morales, and foreign support, pushing belligerents to a peace conference. In 1979, the government failed to clear guerillas out of the countryside, and the guerillas failed to storm governmental positions in towns and cities. The stalemate was harmful to Rhodesians. With the loss of vital Mozambique ports in 1975 and renewed guerilla offensives, the Rhodesian economy plummeted. As Robin Renwick has evaluated, ‘the war … was exerting the real pressure on the economy’. The budget deficit, from a low of R$2.4 million in 1975, spiraled to R$262.3 million in 1979.[xv] In turn, economic hardships led to shortages of military funding and then battlefield failures. The Rhodesian tactic of fortifying villages also failed, essentially leaving the country to guerillas. In 1979, 95% of Rhodesia was under martial law[xvi], showing guerillas attack across the nation. In a report of the Rhodesian Army in 1977, the Army recommended to ‘arrive at an early political settlement before the point of no return’.[xvii] Morales were low for Rhodesians: even Ian Smith admitted ‘declining confidence … in the long-term future of our country’.[xviii] The whites are almost forced to accept a deal. On the guerilla side, they recognized that the prospects for an early triumph in the field were also small.[xix] Twenty years of warfare exhausted Africans, both inside ZANU and ZAPU and outside in the neighboring states of Zambia and Mozambique.[xx] With threats to cut off aid, the Zimbabweans are willing to attempt a peace conference held by a third-party mediator, which is the Lancaster House Conference. A counter-argument could be made that war is continuable for belligerent sides. As Matthew Preston claimed, ‘there was no stalemate’, and military factor didn’t ‘helped determine… the achievement of it (the Lancaster House Agreement)’. For the guerillas, they believed they would win the war, for their continuous advances on the battlefield. The guerillas weren’t wholeheartedly in support of an agreement in the Lancaster House. For the government, the 1979 election that brought the first majority rule government was a ‘success beyond expectations’[xxi], for guerilla attempts to disrupt an election were repealed by the governmental forces guarding settlements, showing Rhodesian control for settlements was not waning. The Rhodesians could still fight the war should the Conference fail.
The author argued that, to a large extent, the British diplomatic policies were a major contributor to the successful signings of the Lancaster House Agreement, both before and during the conference, while other factors, for instance, battlefield stalemate, also helped to facilitate a peace agreement in Lancaster House. The Rhodesian imbroglio, which started in the 1960s, appeared to finally be resolved at Lancaster House. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe was still embroiled in crisis, and eventually, the state completely collapsed during the notorious hyperinflation in the late 1990s.
Bibliography
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[1] The names ‘Rhodesia’ and ‘Zimbabwe’ refer to the same land: the former is used by whites, and the latter is used by blacks. In this essay, the author would employ wording according to the context.
[2] Ian Smith didn’t attend the conference after he cast the only ‘no’ vote over the Constitution issue. See Smith, 486-496*.*
[i] Jeffrey Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979 (London: Routledge, 2021), 35.
[ii] “Lancaster House Agreement,” accessed May 15, 2024, https://peacemaker.un.org/zimbabwe-lancaster-house-agreement79.
[iii] “The Lusaka Communique, Commonwealth Heads of Government, August 1979, on Rhodesia,” African Affairs 79, no. 314 (1980): 115–115.
[iv] Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979, 38.
[v] Sue Onslow, “‘Noises off’: South Africa and the Lancaster House Settlement 1979-1980,” Journal of Southern African Studies 35, no. 2 (2009): 489–506.
[vi] Ian D. Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence (London: John Blake Publishing Ltd, 2008), 484.
[vii] “1979 Conservative Party Manifesto - CONSERVATIVEMANIFESTO.COM,” accessed May 16, 2024, http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1979/.
[viii] Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia, 1890-1979 (London: Pan Books, 1980), 364.
[ix] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 479.
[x] Robert O. Matthews, “From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Prerequisites of a Settlement,” International Journal 45, no. 2 (1990): 318, https://doi.org/10.2307/40202673.
[xi] Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979, 49.
[xii] Davidow, 53.
[xiii] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 481.
[xiv] Matthew Preston, “Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 1 (2004): 320.
[xv] David S. Cownie, “The Transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The 1979 Lancaster House Conference,” ed. Jeffrey Davidow, Africa Today 31, no. 4 (1984): 73.
[xvi] Matthews, “From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,” 320.
[xvii] Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: Rhodesia’s CIO Chief on Record (Alberton: Galago, 1987), 189.
[xviii] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 354.
[xix] Davidow, A Peace in Southern Africa the Lancaster House Conference On Rhodesia, 1979, 64.
[xx] Eliakim Sibanda, “Zimbabwe’s Independence: The Role of Diplomacy,” ed. Michael Charlton, Africa Today 39, no. 1/2 (1992): 157–58.
[xxi] Smith, Bitter Harvest: Zimbabwe and the Aftermath of Its Independence, 450.